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Judicial Implication of Private





With increasing frequency in recent years private individuals
who feel themselves injured by a violation of a particular statute have
requested courts to imply a cause of action for the violation. Judicial
implication of a private cause of action for violation of a statute has
its roots in the ancient English common law doctrine of ubi jus, ibi
remedium-where there is a right, there is a remedy.' This principle
was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States as early
as 1803,2 but was used sparingly until the post-World War II era,
when proliferation of federal regulatory legislation gave rise to its in-
vocation by private litigants seeking redress for statutory violations.
During the tenure of Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Supreme Court
utilized the doctrine to create private remedies for violations of a
broad spectrum of regulatory legislation.' Recent decisions of the Su-
preme Court4 under the leadership of Chief Justice Warren Burger,
however, have signalled the end of this liberal approach. These cases
reflect a philosophy of judicial restraint and reluctance to broaden
* B.A. 1969, Swarthmore College; J.D. 1972, University of Pennsylvania.
** B.A. 1967, Boston University; J.D. 1970, University of Michigan. Messrs.
McMahon and Rodos, both members of the Philadelphia Bar, recently participated
as counsel before the Supreme Court of the United States in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S.
66 (1975), in which the issue of judicial implication of a private cause of action was
decided.
1. BLACK'S LAw DIC'TONARY 1690 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
2. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
3. Perhaps the most widely litigated of the judicially implied remedies are
those arising under the federal securities laws. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); LI. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
4. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975); Securities Inv. Protection Corp. v.
Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975); National R.R. Pass'r Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R.
Pass'rs, 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary in striking contrast to the phi-
losophy of the Warren Court. Consistent with this philosophy of re-
straint is the Court's adoption of previously disfavored techniques of
statutory interpretation and a preference for administrative remedies
expressly provided by Congress.
This article will describe the common-law origins of the doctrine
of implied causes of action and its development in the United States
and will culminate with a study of the Burger Court's approach to the
issue.
II. Judicially Created Remedies at Common Law
Two hundred years ago Blackstone wrote, "[Lit is a general and
indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal
remedy, by suit or action at law, whenever that right is invaded." 5
English courts have long provided a private, legal remedy for statuto-
ry violations. In the 1703 case of Anonymous' an individual sued for
damages, alleging a violation of a statute that contained no express
remedy. In support of its implication of a remedy, the court reasoned
that
where-ever a statute enacts anything, or prohibits anything, for
the advantage of any person, -that person shall have remedy to re-
cover the advantage given him, or to have satisfaction for the
injury done him contrary to law by the same statute; for it would
be a fine thing to make a law by which one has a right, but
no remedy. .... 7
Similarly, in Rowning v. Goodchild8 plaintiff sued for damages re-
sulting from defendant-postmaster's failure to deliver mail. Plaintiff
alleged that the statutes that established the postal system required the
delivery of mail to the addressee's residence and that defendant's
practice of leaving it at the post office to be picked up by each
addressee violated the statute. The defense argued that the statute
itself contained an express and, therefore, exclusive remedy in the
form of a fine. This contrasted with the statute in Anonymous, which
contained no express remedy. Unfortunately without analysis of the
issue, the court held that defendant-postmaster had violated the law
and that the express criminal remedy did not bar plaintiffs action.
The first detailed analysis in English law of the judicial implica-
tion of a private remedy is found in Couch v. Steel.9 The statutes in
that case imposed an obligation upon ship owners to furnish certain
medicines on board ships making international voyages. Plaintiff, a
5. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *23.
6. 87 Eng. Rep. 791 (Q.B. 1703).
7. Id.
8. 2 Black. W. 906 (1773).
9. 118 Eng. Rep. 1193 (Q.B. 1854).
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seaman on one of defendant's ships, became ill at sea. He alleged that
an insufficient supply of medicines on board had aggravated his
illness. None of the statute's provisions expressly created a private
remedy for damages. One provision did provide, however, that indi-
viduals convicted of violating the statute were liable for a penalty, a
portion of which was paid to the person who reported the violation.
Even though plaintiff might have been considered an informer and,
thus, entitled to part of the statutory penalty, a separate, private cause
of action for money damages was implied.
In considering and rejecting various objections to the implication
of a private cause of action, the court enunciated a rule that foreshad-
owed American decisions 100 years later. Noting that "compensation
for private special damage seems not to have been contemplated" by
the statute, 10 the court reasoned that the statutory purpose was to
benefit seamen, such as plaintiff, and that the expressly provided
remedy did not suit that purpose. Rather than providing compensa-
tion to injured seamen, the statutory penalty was simply "a punish-
ment for the non-performance of the public duty."'" The court distin-
guished another case in which a private cause of action had not been
implied from a statute, stating that in the earlier case the statute at
issue was not intended to benefit a class of persons of which plaintiff
was a member. 2 By its analysis the court established two elements of
the doctrine of implied, private causes of action that remain a part of
the law today: (1) plaintiff must be a member of a class of persons
the statute was designed to protect; and (2) the expressly provided
remedy must be insufficient to fulfill the stautory purpose.' 3
III. Development of the American Doctrine of Implied Causes of
Action
The British legal system had been implying private causes of
action in statutes not specifically authorizing private suits for well
over 200 years before the United States Supreme Court directly
considered the matter in 1916.14 Then, another forty-three years
passed before the Court again confronted the issue in a major deci-
sion.15 Beginning in 1959 and continuing through 1971, however, the
10. Id. at 1197.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. E.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
14. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S 33 (1916).
15. See T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464 (1959).
Supreme Court decided a number of important cases implying private
causes of action."0 Most of these were decided during Earl Warren's
term as Chief Justice . 7 They reflected a willingness on the Court's
part to go beyond the statutes involved to create private remedies that
Congress had not expressed an intent to grant. In the process of
creating judicial remedies for violation of statutes, the Court enunciat-
ed certain requirements for the implication of a private cause of
action. First, plaintiff must be a member of the class for whose
benefit the statute was enacted.' Second, implication of a cause of
action must further the congressional purpose in enacting the statute
and the court should consider whether legislative history supports
implication. 19 Last, the penalties or remedies provided under the
statute must be inadequate to assure its complete effectiveness.2"
A. Member of the Class for Whose Benefit the Statute Was Enacted
Following English legal precedent, 2' in 1916 the Supreme Court
ruled that plaintiff must be a member of the class for whose benefit
the statute was enacted to sue for its violation.22 In Texas & Pacific
Railway Co. v. Rigsby2 the Supreme Court reasoned that a
disregard of the command of the statute is a wrongful act, and
where it results in damage to one of the class for whose especial
benefit the statute was enacted, the right to recover the damages
from the party in default is implied.
24
In Rigsby the plaintiff, a switchman working in defendant's railroad
yards, was taking railway cars to the repair shop when he fell from a
box car because of a defective handhold. He sued the railroad for
damages under section 2 of the 1910 amendment to the Federal
Safety Appliance Act.2 5 Defendant argued that although other sec-
16. E.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narc., 403
U.S. 388 (1971); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969); Wyandotte
Transp. Co.-v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S.
426 (1964); Hewitt-Robins Inc. v. Eastern Freight-ways, Inc., 371 U.S. 84 (1962);
T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464 (1959).
17. See note 16. The authors have included Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narc., 403 U.S. 388 (1971), in the discussion of the War-
ren Court decisions. Although Chief Justice Burger was on the Court at the time
Bivens was decided, Justices Powell and Rehnquist were not and the majority and
concurring opinions represent the approach taken by the Warren Court.
18. E.g., Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967); Texas
& Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
19. E.g., Hewitt-Robins Inc. v. Eastern Freight-ways, Inc., 371 U.S. 84 (1962).
20. E.g., Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969); J.I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
21. See notes 5-12 and accompanying text supra.
22. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 39.
25. This section provided,
All cars must be equipped with secure sill steps and efficient hand brakes;
all cars requiring secure ladders and secure running boards shall be equipped
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tions of the Act contained penal provisions, neither section 2 nor any
other section provided private causes of action. The Court dismissed
defendant's arguments and held that a railroad switchman obviously
was a member of the class the statute was enacted to protect. Since he
was injured through defendant's disregard of the statute, he could sue
for damages.2"
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics27 the Court granted an implied cause of action to the largest
class possible-all individuals in the United States. Plaintiff sued fed-
eral narcotics agents for their allegedly unconstitutional conduct, ar-
guing that by entering and searching his apartment and arresting him
without a warrant or probable cause, the agents violated the fourth
amendment of the United States Constitution. In permitting the pri-
vate cause of action, the Court held that the fourth amendment's
guarantee that all citizens shall be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures is a federal right that courts should protect by entertain-
ing private damage suits against persons who infringe upon that
right.25
Voicing the minority's opposition to this expansive application
of the doctrine, Justice Blackmun argued, "I . . . feel that the
judicial legislation, which the Court by its opinion today concededly is
effectuating, opens the door for another avalanche of new federal
cases." 29 As will be seen below, this sentiment has now gained
further support on the Court. The Court's willingness in Bivens not
only to open the courthouse doors to private suits by implying a cause
of action, but also to open the courthouse doors to potentially every-
one in the United States, is indicative of the liberal philosophy of
the Warren Court.
B. Implication Furthers Congressional Purposes
A major area of inquiry for courts implying private causes of
action is the congressional purpose in enacting the statute at issue.
Legislative history is the primary tool in determining this purpose.
with such ladders and running boards, and all cars having ladders shall also
be equipped with secure hand holds or grab irons on their roofs at the tops
of such ladders.
Id. at 37.
26. Id. at 40.
27. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
28. Id. at 393.
29. Id. at 430.
This determination is no simple task, however, because legislative
history usually contains little or no discussion of or reference to
private causes of action. Logically, if Congress had considered the
matter and had wished to permit private lawsuits, it most probably
would have provided for them in the statute.
Two strikingly similar cases that resulted in directly contrary
decisions by the Supreme Court illustrate the significant liberalization
of the implied cause of action doctrine by the Warren Court. Both
decisions were based on judicial interpretation of congressional pur-
pose in the same statute. In T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United States" motor
carriers certified by the Interstate Commerce Commission were sued
under the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 by shippers of goods who
challenged the reasonableness of the carriers' charges. Section 217 of
the Act required carriers to file their transportation charges as tariffs
with the ICC. These tariffs remained effective until suspended or
changed in accordance with specified procedures and carriers were
forbidden to charge or collect any other rate.31 The government
argued that subsections 216(b) and (d) of the Act created a judicial-
ly enforceable right in a shipper to be free from unreasonable
charges' 2 and that a private cause of action should be implied for
violation of that right. The Court rejected this contention, however,
holding that a private cause of action would not be implied. By
examining the legislative history of the Motor Carrier Act, the Court
found that amendments that would have made common carriers liable
for damages to persons injured by violations of the Act had been
offered and rejected. In addition, the Court noted the ICC's consistent
position that nothing in the Act created statutory liability for unrea-
sonable rates.13 The Court concluded that there was nothing in the
statute or its history that would support a private cause of action.
Just three years later, however, the Supreme Court was again
presented with a private suit alleging violations of the Motor Carrier
Act and reached a different result. In Hewitt-Robins Inc. v. Eastern
Freight-ways, Inc.34 the Court held that a private cause of action
30. 359 U.S. 464 (1959).
31. Id. at 465.
32. Id. at 468. These sections provided,
(b) It shall be the duty of every [such] common carrier . . . to establish,
observe, and enforce just and reasonable rates, charges, and classifications,
and just and reasonable regulations and practices relating thereto ....
(d) all charges made for any service rendered or to be rendered by any
[such] common carrier . . . shall be just and reasonable, and every unjust
and unreasonable charge for such service or any part thereof, is prohibited
and declared to be unlawful. . ..
Id. at 469.
33. Id. at 471.
34. 371 U.S. 84 (1962).
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should be implied. One reason for the contrasting decisions in the two
cases is the different treatment of legislative history in determining
congressional purpose. Hewitt-Robins involved a shipper's action un-
der the Motor Carrier Act to recover the difference in rate charges
resulting from a carrier's practice of carrying unrouted, intrastate
shipments on its interstate routes at higher rates than those applicable
to its intrastate routes. The action was stayed by a federal district
court pending a review by the ICC of the reasonableness of the
practice.33 The ICC found it unreasonable. The court then dismissed
plaintiff's complaint because the Act did not provide a remedy; 6 the
court of appeals affirmed.3 7 Both courts based their decisions on
T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United States.
3 8
Notwithstanding its recent decision in T.I.M.E. the Supreme
Court reversed and distinguished the earlier case. The litigation in
T.I.M.E. was directed at the reasonableness of the rates charged. In
that situation the Court found that the Act itself provided protection
for shippers against unreasonable rates and that these express reme-
dies precluded judicial implication. 0 In Hewitt-Robins, however, it
was a routing practice that was being attacked.40 The Court decided,
therefore, that allowance of a damage action would not hamper
efficient administration of the Act. Moreover, the Court found that a
judicial remedy would be a useful adjunct to the expressly provided
administrative remedies.
[T]he allowance of misrouting actions would have a healthy de-
terrent effect upon the utilization of misrouting practices in the
motor carrier field, which, in turn, would minimize 'cease and
desist' proceedings before the Commission. Finally, and not to
be overlooked, the absence of any judicial remedy places the
shipper entirely at the mercy of the carrier, contrary to the over-
riding purpose of the Act.41
Examining the same legislative history the Court reached a
different result than it had in T.I.M.E. Justice Clark noted that
exercise of the judicial remedy would support and be in "nowise
inconsistent with" the overall purpose of the Act as illustrated by its
35. Id. at 84-85.
36. 187 F. Supp. 722 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
37. 293 F.2d 205 (2d Cir. 1961).
38. See notes 30-33 and accompanying text supra.
39. 359 U.S. 464, 469-72 (1959).
40. 371 U.S. at 88.
41. Id.
legislative history.42 The use of the phrase "nowise inconsistent with"
evidenced a significant change in the standard for implying a private
cause of action. In T.I.M.E. the question had been whether legislative
history would support the implication of a cause of action, but in
Hewitt-Robins the question was whether implication of a private
cause of action would be inconsistent with the congressional purpose.
This approach to legislative history-that is, looking to the
history fdr an indication that Congress wanted to bar private suits and
judicially implying private causes of action in the absence of such
indication-was followed in Wyandotte Transportation Co. v. United
States.43 In that case several barges were sunk in the Mississippi
River. The federal government raised one barge at great expense after
its owner, Wyandotte Transportation Company, abandoned the ves-
sel. The United States then sued Wyandotte for costs of removal.
Under the Rivers and Harbors Act the owner of a sunken craft has a
duty to remove it and "failure to do so shall be considered as an
abandonment . . . and subject the same to removal by the United
States . . . . The statute did not provide, however, that the United
States could recover for expenditures in raising vessels.45 Neverthe-
less, the Court stated,
There is no indication anywhere else-in the legislative history
of the Act, in the predecessor statutes, or in nonstatutory law-
42. Id. at 89. Although Justice Clark's opinion discusses and distinguishes
T.I.M.E., possibly the most telling reason for the different result was the change in
the makeup of the Court-the arrival of what came to be known as the Warren
Court. In 1959 the majority in T.I.M.E., who held that there was no private cause
of action under the Motor Carrier Act, consisted of Justices Frankfurter, Whittaker,
Harlan, Brennan and Stewart. The minority, who argued for implication of a private
cause of action, consisted of Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas and
Clark. In the 1962 Hewitt-Robins decision the four Justices who dissented in
T.I.M.E. again held that a private cause of action should be implied. They were
joined in this decision by Justice Goldberg, who had replaced Justice Frankfurter, and
Justice Brennan, the only member of the Court to change his decision from T.I.M.E.
to Hewitt-Robins. Dissenting in Hewitt-Robins were Justices Harlan and Stewart,
who were in the majority in T.I.M.E., and Justice White, who had replaced Justice
Whittaker.
43. 389 U.S. 191 (1967).
44. 33 U.S.C. § 409 (1970). This section provides in its relevant part,
It shall not be lawful . . .to voluntarily or carelessly sink, or permit to
cause to be sunk, vessels or other craft in navigable channels . . .. And
whenever a vessel, raft or other craft is wrecked and sunk in a navigable
channel, accidentally or otherwise, it shall be the duty of the owner of such
sunken craft to immediately mark it with a buoy or beacon during the day
and a lighted lantern at night, and to maintain such marks until the sunken
craft is removed or abandoned, and the neglect or failure of the said
owner so to do shall be unlawful; and it shall be the duty of the owner of
such sunken craft to commence the immediate removal of the same and
prosecute such removal diligently, and failure to do so shall be considered
as an abandonment of such craft, and subject the same to removal by the
United States as provided for in sections 41-1 to 416, 418, and 502 of this
title.
45. 389 U.S. at 198-200.
Implied Causes of Action
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
that Congress might have intended that a party who negligently
sinks a vessel should be shielded from personal responsibility.
46
The Court concluded that the United States was a principal benefi-
ciary of the Act 4 7 and implied a cause of action to recover costs
incurred in removing the barge.
Thus, as in Hewitt-Robins48 the Court looked to legislative
history for an indication that Congress wished to preclude the impli-
cation. Absent this negative indication the Court assumed the func-
tion of fashioning remedies to achieve what it considered the overall
purpose of the Act.49 Naturally this approach facilitated the introduc-
tion of policy considerations into statutory interpretation throughout
the federal judicary. As Justice Harlan pointed out in Bivens,
In resolving that question it seems to me that the range of policy
considerations we may take into account is at least as broad as
the range of those a legislature would consider with respect to an
express statutory authorization of a traditional remedy.50
Justice Harlan recognized that the Supreme Court had granted the
judiciary broad powers, not unlike legislative powers, to imply causes
of action to promote social goals embodied in statutory law.
In the twelve years from T.I.M.E. to Bivens the investigation of
legislative history developed from a study of whether Congress could
be said to have authorized private suits to a study of whether implica-
tion of suits was inconsistent with legislative intent. Absent an indica-
tion that Congress wished to preclude private suits, the Warren Court
used legislative history not as an aid in statutory construction, but as a
springboard for creation of judicial remedies.
C. Express Remedies Inadequate To Insure Statute's Effectiveness
Another criterion used by the Warren Court was whether the
express remedies contained in the statute were sufficient to accom-
plish the legislative purpose. For example, in Wyandotte5 defendant-
shipowners contended that because the statute itself contained specific
and exclusive remedies, there could be no private cause of action.
Although agreeing that the Act contained criminal penalties, the
Court rejected this argument:
46. Id. at 200.
47. Id. at 202-04.
48. See notes 34-42 and accompanying text supra.
49. 389 U.S. at 200.
50. 403 U.S. 388, 407 (1971).
51. 389 U.S. 191 (1967); see notes 43-47 and accompanying text supra.
That section contains only meager monetary penalties. ,In many
cases, as here, the combination of these fines and the Govern-
ment's in rem fights would not serve to reimburse the United
States for removal expenses. It is true that § 16 also provides
for prison terms, but this punishment is hardly a satisfactory
remedy for the pecuniary injury which the negligent shipowner
may inflict upon the sovereign.
52
This inquiry into the sufficiency of express remedies often
ranges beyond a review of the type of penalty provided. Frequently,
the Court examined the agency involved in the statute's enforcement
to determine if it had the resources or determination to protect
adequately the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted. In J.I.
Case Co. v. Borak5" the Court found that private enforcement of
proxy rules was a necessary supplement to action by the Securities
and Exchange Commission since the SEC did not have the resources
to examine independently all facts set out in proxy materials. The
Court equated shareholder litigation with antitrust treble damage
actions; both were said to promote effective enforcement of the
legislation. Similarly, in Allen v. State Board of Elections5 4 the Su-
preme Court concluded that if each citizen were required to rely
solely on litigation brought by the Attorney General, the goal of the
Voting Rights Act would not be achieved. Like the SEC the Attorney
General was handicapped by a limited staff and was unable to move
quickly and effectively to insure compliance with the Act.55
This approach marked a definite departure from that taken in
T.I.M.E.5 6 In that case the Court held that permitting an attack on
rates would be inconsistent with the extensive statutory scheme of
regulation.57 In Borak and Allen, however, even though Congress
had established extensive remedies for specific problems, the Court
nonetheless reviewed those remedies to determine their sufficiency in
fulfilling the legislation's purpose. Upon finding these remedies insuf-
ficient, it augmented them by implying a private cause of action.
In summary, the cases decided by the Warren Court evinced an
inclination to involve the judiciary in the formulation of remedies to
effectuate what the Court considered important social policies embod-
ied in various statutes. Legislative history was utilized to determine
congressional policy. If the Court did not discern a clear indication
that Congress wanted to preclude a private cause of action, it judicial-
ly created remedies to fit the perceived purpose of the legislation.
52. 389 U.S. at 202.
53. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
54. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
55. Id. at 556.
56. See notes 30-33 and accompanying text supra.
57. 359 U.S. 464, 471-72, 474-75 (1959).
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IV. A New Direction-The Burger Court
The Warren Court's judicially active approach fashioned civil
remedies for private parties from statutes regulating activities ranging
from interstate water transportation"8 to the solicitation of proxy
votes. " In sharp contrast are the recent decisions of the Supreme
Court6" that indicate the Burger Court's distaste for the increased case
load generated by this approach. Three times in the last two years the
Court has heard and decided cases in which implication of private
causes of action was at issue. Each time the Court refused to imply a
cause of action. These cases mark a distinct change in the attitude of
the High Court toward implication of private causes of action and
signal a new era in which federal courts will refuse to entertain
private suits based on statutes that do not expressly grant private
remedies.
The new direction taken by the Supreme Court can be illustrated
best by comparing the three recent decisions with the decisions of the
courts of appeals6' in the same cases. Understandably the lower court
decisions followed the prior Supreme Court holdings discussed
above.62 This comparison also frames a clear image of the High
Court's attitude not only toward the doctrine of implication of private
causes of action, but also toward fundamental questions of statutory
interpretation and the relationship of the judiciary to administrative
agencies.
A. Decisions of the Courts of Appeals
In the Rail Passenger Service Act of 19708 Congress declared
that "no railroad may discontinue any intercity rail passenger service
whatsoever other than in accordance" with the provisions of the
Act.6" The Act further provided that prior to January 1, 1975, no
58. Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967); see notes
43-49, 51-52 and accompanying text supra.
59. JI. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); see note 53 and accompany-
ing text supra.
60. Cases cited note 4 supra.
61. Ash v. Cort, 496 F.2d 416 (3d Cir. 1974); SEC v. Guaranty Bond & Sec.
Corp., 496 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1974); Potomac Pass'rs Ass'n v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry.,
475 F.2d 325 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
62. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narc., 403 U.S.
388 (1971); Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967); J.I. Case
Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
63. 45 U.S.C. §§ 501-644 (1970).
64. Id. § 642.
intercity passenger trains could be discontinued unless the railroad
had entered into a contract with the National Rail Passenger Service
Corporation, commonly known as Amtrak, 5 which was given au-
thority to permit discontinuances. In Potomac Passengers Association
v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co.," known as the Amtrak litigation,
two appeals were consolidated from orders dismissing two similar
actions brought by associations of rail passengers against railroads
and Amtrak seeking to enjoin discontinuation of rail service. The
Amtrak Act contained no express authority for this kind of suit.
In reversing the dismissals the court of appeals characterized the
question before it "as an issue in determining who is a proper plaintiff
to assert that a corporation created by the government is violating its
statutory authority."6 7 The court considered the tripartite standing
test enunciated by the Supreme Court in Association of Data Process-
ing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp,68 but felt that the only aspect
of that test requiring detailed analysis was whether there was any evi-
dence that Congress intended to preclude standing for a private
plaintiff.69 While this approach was less stringent than some of the
earlier decisions of the Supreme Court, 70 it directly followed the
Court's statement in Hewitt-Robins7'1 that a private cause of action
will be implied when it was not inconsistent with the overall purpose
of the Act as determined by an examination of legislative history.
Thus, under the court of appeals approach only explicit evidence that
"Congress intended to deny standing to injured and aggrieved pas-
65. Id. § 564(a).
66. 475 F.2d 325 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom. National R.R. Pass'r Corp.
v. National Ass'n of R.R. Pass'rs, 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
67. id. at 329. The court was conscious that its approach might be objected
to on the grounds that these actions were brought against private railroad companies
as well as the semipublic Amtrak corporation and that this approach generally was
applied to situations in which courts were reviewing actions of administrative agen-
cies. In addressing this problem the court noted,
The fine distinction among the doctrines of standing, jurisdiction, review-
ability, and causes of action often pose thorny problems for the law ....
Fortunately, however, we need not resolve these problems here, for in this
case analysis of all these doctrines leads to the same conclusion-allowing
adjudication of the merits.
Id.
68. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). The court of appeals stated that test as follows:
(1) whether the plaintiff has alleged that he suffered injury in fact, eco-
nomic or otherwise . . . , (2) whether the complainant is arguably within
the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitu-
tional guarantee in question . . . and (3) whether judicial review has been
precluded by the legislature ....
475 F.2d at 329 (citations omitted).
69. 475 F.2d at 331.
70. See, e.g., T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464 (1959). The court
concluded that this liberal test should apply "[b]ecause of Amtrak's quasi-public
character, and the consequential public interest in ensuring that its actions conform
to its legislative mandate .... " 475 F.2d at 330.
71. 371 U.S. 84 (1962).
72. Id. at 89.
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sengers"78 would bar the action. The court searched for and failed to
find this positive indication on the face of the statute, in the legisla-
tive history, and in the overall purposes of the Act.
Section 307 of the statute 74 authorized suits by the Attorney
General and by railroad employees and their representatives to en-
force the Act. The court considered whether the maxim of judicial
construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius,75 required holding
that by expressly granting remedies to the Attorney General and
employees, Congress intended to exclude private remedies to others
injured by violation of the Act. Rejecting application of the expressio
maxim, the court reasoned that the two expressly granted remedies
were not evidence of congressional intent to preclude private suits.
Expressly granting a remedy to the Attorney General indicated only
that Congress was ensuring that that officer could sue for "what
otherwise might be viewed as private rights. '7 6 Expressly granting a
remedy to employees only indicated congressional concern that em-
ployees have standing under the Act and that this authority to sue be
broader than that of other potential plaintiffs. 77 Thus, nothing in the
statute was found to indicate a congressional intent to deny standing
to private plaintiffs.
Nor was the court persuaded by legislative history that Congress
intended to preclude private suits. During hearings on the bill that
became the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, an amdendment was
introduced that would have made it clear that any person injured by a
violation could sue.78 The amendment was never adopted. Appellees
argued that this was a clear indication of congressional intent to
preclude private suits. 79 The court found no explanation of the
amendment's failure in the legislative materials, however, and con-
cluded that "[i]nterpretation of statutes cannot safely rest upon
changes made in congressional committee without explanation."' 0
Finally, the court examined the purposes of the Act and con-
cluded that permitting a private plaintiff to sue would not contradict
73. 475 F.2d at 337.
74. 45 U.S.C. § 547 (1970).
75. "Expression of one thing is the exclusion of others." BLACK'S LAW DIC-
TIONARY 692 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
76. 475 F.2d at 332.
77. Id. at 333.
78. Supplemental Hearings on H.R. 17849 & S. 3706 Before the Subcomm. on
Transp. & Aero. of the House Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 122 (1970).
79. 475 F.2d at 335.
80. Id.
them."' The court discerned these purposes to include permitting
railroads to "discontinue uneconomical trains that were draining their
resources,"8 2 while preventing "complete abandonment of intercity
rail passenger service." ' Appellees argued that permitting all injured
persons to sue for violations of the Act would cripple the railroads
with massive litigation expenses. The court's response was that
"[a]chievement of Congress' objectives plainly requires compliance
with the provisions of the Amtrak Act, and judicial review of Am-
trak's actions is necessary if compliance is to be assured.1
84
This detailed analysis by the court of appeals in Amtrak was
based on the Data Processing test,8 5 a test originally applied to
challenges of administrative agency actions.8 6 The court noted, how-
ever, that a private cause of action in the instant case would be
equally justifiable under any other test.8 7 Thus, the court of appeals
decision in Amtrak can be seen as a liberal application of the implica-
tion doctrine. A private cause of action was implied because the court
found no clear indication of congressional intent to the contrary and
no indication that implication would infringe on the primary jurisdic-
tion of administrative agencies.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit adopted an equally
liberal approach in Ash v. Cort.ss In this case a registered voter and
shareholder of Bethlehem Steel Corporation sued the directors and
the corporation for alleged violations of a federal prohibition on
corporate campaign contributions.8 9 Plaintiffs sought injunctive and
monetary relief, alleging that defendants had used and were continu-
ing to use corporate funds to purchase advertisements supporting the
1972 presidential campaign of Richard M. Nixon. The lower court
granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. On appeal plain-
tiff-appellant argued that he was injured both as a stockholder and as
a voter by the expenditure of corporate funds. The court of appeals
framed the issue as whether plaintiff had an implied cause of action
under the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, which makes it a crime for
a corporation to spend its funds on political campaigns.9 0 That statute
does not expressly provide for private suits by injured shareholders or
voters. 9'
81. Id. at 336-38.
82. Id. at 337.
83. Id., quoting H.R. REP. No. 1580, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970).
84. 475 F.2d at 337.
85. See note 68 supra.
86. See note 70 and accompanying text supra.
87. 475 F.2d at 329.
88. 496 F.2d 416 (3d Cir. 1974), rev'd, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
89. 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970).
90. Id.
91. The court first held that the action was not moot and that plaintiff as a
voter and stockholder had standing to sue. 496 F.2d at 419-20.
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Charting its course the court of appeals stated the rule governing
implied causes of action as follows:
To find a cause of action 'implied' in a statute, we must
determine (1) that the provision violated was designed to protect
a class of persons including the plaintiff from the harm of which
plaintiff complains and (2) that it is appropriate, in light of the
statute's purposes, to afford plaintiff the remedy sought. 92
In determining whether an implied cause of action is appropriate in
light of a statute's purposes, legislative intent plays a significant role.
As the Third Circuit stated,
Certainly, legislative intent is relevant; where the legislature
clearly has indicated its intent to grant or withhold a cause of
action, implicitly or explicitly, courts will give effect to that in-
tent . . . . Absent some reasonably clear indication of legisla-
tive attention to the possible creation of a cause of action, how-
ever, courts ascertain the policies underlying the substantive law
and determine the propriety, as a means of effectuating those
policies of affording litigants a particular remedy.93
The problem in Cort, like the problem in Amtrak, was the lack of
clear legislative intent.
The statute in Cort contained an express criminal remedy9 4 as
well as a civil remedy to be pursued by the Attorney General.9 5
Therefore, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius6 was
invoked to urge the court to deny a private right of action. The court
rejected application of the expressio maxim, noting that in a number
of decisions the Supreme Court had found an express criminal reme-
dy no bar to implication of a private right97 and that the express
criminal penalty of the statute in question could not be viewed as a
remedy for the harm inflicted upon plaintiff. Furthermore, the court
reasoned that while the Attorney General was given a civil cause of
action for violation of title III of the Act, this case was brought for a
violation of title II and the presence of a limited civil remedy in title
III did not indicate legislative intent to exclude a private remedy in
another part of the statute.98
92. 496 F.2d at 421.
93. Id. (emphasis added, citation omitted).
94. 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970).
95. 2 id. § 438(d)(1)-(5).
96. "Expression of one thing is the exclusion of others." BLAcK's LAW DIc-
TIONARY 692 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
97. 496 F.2d at 422. The court cited as examples Wyandotte Transp. Co. v.
United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967), and Texas & Pac. Ry..v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33
(1916).
98. 496 F.2d at 422.
The court went on to consider whether implication of a private
right would "effectuate the act and whether any 'collateral' considera-
tions counsel withholding this remedy." 99 Reasoning that the statute
sought to prevent corporate campaign contributions, the court con-
cluded that the "relative expeditiousness" of a private remedy would
promote that end. 1°0 Furthermore, the court noted that "the politician
whose election if facilitated by a violation of § 610 may be in charge
of the statute's enforcement."'' Therefore, the court concluded that
the Act's purpose would be served by permitting private suits.
10 2
A review of legislative history demonstrated to the court that the
legislature was motivated by two considerations in enacting the feder-
al prohibitions on corporate campaign contributions: protecting the
federal election process; and preventing corporate officials from con-
tributing corporate funds to political parties.0 3 Thus, as a voter and
shareholder plaintiff was within the class of persons the Act was
designed to protect' 014 and a private right of action was inferred.105
In SEC v. Guaranty Bond & Securities Corp. 00 (hereinafter
referred to as "SIPC"), the SEC brought an action against a broker-
dealer, alleging net capital violations of the federal securities laws.
10 7
A receiver was appointed to take charge of all Guaranty's assets.
Later the receiver filed a petition for an order directing the Securities
Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) to intervene in the action
and afford customers of Guaranty the benefits of the Securities Inves-
tor Protection Act of 1970.08 The major issue of the case was
whether the statute could be applied to the instant situation since
actions of Guaranty had occurred prior to the passage of the Act,10 9
but the court also held that the receiver, as the representative of the
broker-dealer's customers, could force the SIPC to meet its obliga-
tions under the statute." 0 The court reasoned that
mhe lack of express language of exclusivity in providing for
an enforcement action by the S.E.C., coupled with a general pro-
vision allowing for suits against the S.I.P.C., evidences an intent




103. Id. at 422; see United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 113 (1948); 40 CONG.
REc. 96 (1906) (remarks of President Theodore Roosevelt).
104. 496 F.2d at 422.
105. Id. at 424. Judge Aldisert wrote a forceful dissent. Id. at 426-29.
106. 496 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nom. Securities Inv. Protection
Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975).
107. Securities Exchange Act § 15(c)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(3) (1970).
108. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-l (1970).
109. The court of appeals held that it could be applied to Guaranty. 496 F.2d
at 149-50.
110. Id. at 150.
Implied Causes of Action
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
by Congress that the statute should not be . . .narrowly con-
strued .... 111
As demonstrated above, these decisions of the courts of appeals
reflected a judicial disposition to create remedies in support of per-
ceived legislative objectives. They were a logical extension of the
Supreme Court decisions of the previous ten years. The Supreme
Court granted petitions for writs of certiorari in Amtrak,"
2 Cort,"38
and SIPC.114 Taken together, the High Court's decisions in these
cases represent a distinct change in the attitude of the Court toward
implied causes of action.
B. The Burger Court's Decisions
The Supreme Court's first venture into the area under the lead-
ership of Chief Justice Warren Burger came in the Amtrak case.
115
The Supreme Court approached the problem as follows:
[T]he threshold question clearly is whether the Amtrak Act or
any other provision of law creates a cause of action whereby a
private party such as the respondent can enforce duties and obli-
gations imposed by the Act; for it is only if such a right of ac-
tion exists that we need consider whether the respondent had
standing to bring the action and whether the District Court had
jurisdiction to entertain it.1"
The most striking aspect of this decision is that the Supreme Court
did not use a substantially different analysis from that used by the
court of appeals, but using the same analysis the Court arrived at the
opposite conclusion.
The Court first concluded that "the remedies created in §
307(a) are the exclusive means to enforce the duties and obligations
imposed by the act." 17 The court of appeals had decided that §
307(a) was only evidence of congressional intent to insure that
additional remedies were available. 118 The Supreme Court then ana-
lyzed the legislative history of the Act and, like the court of appeals,
noted that a proposal to permit unlimited private suits was made to
111. Id.
112. 411 U.S. 981 (1973).
113. 419 U.S. 992 (1974).
114. 419 U.S. 894 (1974).
115. National R.R. Pass'r Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Pass'rs, 414 U.S. 453
(1974).
116. Id. at 456.
117. Id. at 458.
118. 475 F.2d at 333.
the House committee during hearings and rejected."19 The Court
recognized that the hearing transcript did not indicate the opinion of
any committee member on the proposal to permit private suits, but
stated, "[I]t is surely most unlikely that the members of the Committee
would have stood mute if they had disagreed with it.""'  Thus, the
Supreme Court found the committee's mute response to support the
contention that Congress intended to grant no private causes of action
under the Act. This same legislative history, however, had previously
been dismissed by the court of appeals as ambiguous and an insuffi-
cient basis from which to deduce legislative intent. 121
Finally, the Supreme Court considered whether implication of a
private cause of action would be consistent with the Act's purpose
of achieving economic viability for the basic rail passenger system.1 22
The Court reasoned that creating private causes of action would also
create the "potential . . .for a barrage of lawsuits that, either indi-
vidually or collectively, could frustrate or severely delay any proposed
passenger train discontinuance." 2 ' The Supreme Court decided to
entrust enforcement to the agency created by the Act. Judicial pro-
ceedings were thought to be more burdensome than helpful. 124 This
reflected a confidence in administrative agencies not shared by the
court of appeals. In direct contradiction the court of appeals had
held that judicial action was necessary to ensure compliance and
would be less burdensome than agency procedure."
12
The essential difference between the two decisions in Amtrak
was the attitude of the courts. While the court of appeals relied on the
utility of judicial access, the Supreme Court relied on the legislatively
created administrative procedures. While the court of appeals was
willing to create a cause of action in the absence of a contrary
legislative intent, the Supreme Court was hesitant. Finally, while the
court of appeals refused to accept an approach to legislative interpre-
tation that would restrain judicial implication of a cause of action
when a statute provided specific remedies, the Supreme Court wel-
comed it.
These same themes were evident in the Supreme Court's deci-
sions in Cort v. Ash"26 and SIPC.127 As described above, the issue
119. 414 U.S. at 458-61; see notes 80-82 and accompanying text supra.
120. 414 U.S. at 460.
121. 475 F.2d at 335; see notes 78-80 and accompanying text supra.
122. 414 U.S. at 461, quoting H.R. REP. No. 1580, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3
(1970). The court of appeals stated that another purpose of the Act was to prevent
complete abandonment of rail service. 475 F.2d at 337.
123. 414 U.S. at 463.
124. Id. at 463-64.
125. 475 F.2d at 337 & n.13.
126. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
127. 421 U.S. 412 (1975).
Implied Causes of Action
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
confronting the Court in SIPC was whether a receiver appointed to
wind up the affairs of an insolvent brokerage house could sue to
compel the Securities Investor Protection Corporation, a private
membership corporation created by Congress, to meet its obligations
under the statute. One section of the statute establishing the SIPC
allowed the SEC to sue in federal court to compel the Corporation to
act.""8 Citing its decision in Amtrak 2 ' the Court held that this
express remedy precluded an implication of a private right.
As with Amtrak, so with SIPC, Congress has created a corporate
entity to solve a public problem; it has provided for substantial
supervision of its operations by an agency charged with protec-
tion of the public interest-here the SEC-and for enforcement




In SIPC and Cort the Court reiterated its reluctance to imply a
remedy when another is expressly provided. The decisions under-
scored the Court's belief that administrative remedies are more effec-
tive than judicial relief in promoting statutory purposes. As the Court
stated in SIPC,
By this policy [of deferring intervention until a clear showing
is made that customers need the Act's protection], the SIPC
avoids unnecessarily engendering the costs of precipitate liquida-
tions-the costs not only of administering the liquidation, but
also of customer illiquidity and additional loss of confidence in
the capital markets-without sacrifice of any customer protec-
tion that may prove necessary. A customer, by contrast, cannot
be expected to consider, or have adequate information to con-
sider, these public interests in timing his decision to apply to the
courts.
13 1
For this reason the Court decided that a judicial remedy would not be
consistent with its perception of the purpose of the Securities Investor
Protection Act.
Similarly, in Cort v. Ash the Supreme Court ruled that all
complaints by citizens or stockholders for injunctive relief against
corporate campaign financing should go to the Federal Election
Commission.3 2 As to damage suits, the Supreme Court again ana-
128. Securities Investor Protection Act § 7(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78ggg(b) (1970).
129. 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
130. 421 U.S. at 420.
131. Id. at 422.
132. 422 U.S. 66, 77 (1975). The Federal Election Commission was created by
the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendment of 1974, Act of Oct. 15, 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-443, tit. I, § 208(a), 88 Stat. 1280. Although not in effect at the time of
the court of appeals decision, the Supreme Court applied the 1974 amendments as
lyzed the legislative history of the statute and arrived at a conclusion
opposite the one reached by the court of appeals. The court of ap-
peals had looked to the Court's opinion in United States v. CIO,133 in
which the history of this legislation had been examined and found to
have been motivated by two considerations-protecting the electoral
process and preventing the use of the corporate funds for campaign
contributions. 134 The court of appeals considered prevention of this
misuse of funds and the consequent protection of shareholders as
more than an incidental purpose. 135 The Supreme Court, however,
reviewed the same history, as reported in United States v. UA W,
136
and concluded that protecting shareholders was but an incidental pur-
pose of the legislation. 37 Just as in Amtrak the court did not criticize
the lower court's use of legislative history; it simply disagreed on the
conclusions to be drawn therefrom. Since the issue of implication of a
private right of action arises only when legislative history is unclear,
it is not surprising that different courts with different legal philoso-
phies analyzed the same legislative history and arrived at opposite
conclusions.
Thus, in Amtrak, SIPC, and Cort the Supreme Court did not
enunciate any novel formulation of the doctrine of implication of a
private cause of action. Instead the Court indicated a preference for
denying the federal courts jurisdiction of disputes arising under these
statutes. The only new aspect of these decisions was a statement in
Cort that the following issue must be decided in the negative before a
private cause of action will be implied: "[1]s the cause of action one
traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of
the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action
based solely on federal law?"138 The court in Cort answered in the
affirmative, stating that insofar as plaintiff was suing as a sharehold-
er, the action most closely resembled a state ultra vires cause of action
or one for breach of fiducuiary duty.1 9 Again, one discerns a distinct
disinclination for expanding the jurisdiction of federal courts.
Such judicial reluctance was foreign to the Warren Court. In
fact, a review of JM. Case Co. v. Borak'40 and Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics'4' demonstrates that a
intervening law under authority of United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 103 (1801).
133. 335 U.S. 106 (1948).
134. 496 F.2d at 422.
135. Id. at 423.
136. 352 U.S. 567 (1957).
137. 422 U.S. at 79-80.
138. Id. at 78.
139. Id. at 84.
140. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
141. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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similar approach was proposed by defendants, but rejected by the
Court. The more recent cases evince the Burger Court's decision to
retreat from the judicial activism of the Warren Court and to permit
settlement of disputes by judicial and administrative bodies other
than federal courts.
V. The Future of the Doctrine
The Supreme Court has not formulated a new rule in its recent
decisions refusing to imply private causes of action. That the Court
reached decisions directly opposite to those reached by the courts of
appeals is a result of attitudinal and philosophic differences. The
decisions provide little guidance to courts considering the issue in the
future, but certain conclusions can be drawn. First, the Supreme
Court demonstrated great reluctance to expand the jurisdiction of the
federal judiciary, preferring existing agency and state court remedies.
Second the Court restricted the scope of judicial implication by
adopting an approach to statutory interpretation that requires the
judiciary to act only on explicit directions from the legislature. The
role of legislative history has been left ambiguous in this analysis. In
the absence of a clear indication of legislative intent, the statute's
history can support opposite conclusions. In all probability the judi-
cial philosophy of the Burger Court has and will decide the issue.
A. Restriction of Federal Jurisdiction
In Amtrak, SIPC, and Cort the Supreme Court refused to
extend the jurisdiction of federal courts to disputes arising under the
statutes involved. In each case the statutes expressly provided various
administrative remedies.' 42 These administrative remedies were given
the Court's approval while private litigation was found to be of
dubious utility.
This [private litigation establishing precedent in one district that
would not bind courts in another] would completely undercut
the efficient apparatus that Congress sought to provide for Am-
trak to use in the 'paring of uneconomic routes.' It would also
142. In SIPC the Securities Investor Protection Act provided that the SEC could
bring suit to compel SIPC to comply with its statutory responsibilities. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78ggg(b) (1970). In Amtrak section 307 of the Rail Passenger Service Act pro-
vided for civil suits by the Attorney General and any railroad employees to prevent
violation of the Act. 45 U.S.C. § 547 (1970). In Cort v. Ash the Federal Election
Campaign Act Amendment of 1974 provided for administrative relief. 2 U.S.C.A.
§§ 437g-h(a) (Supp. 1976).
produce the anomalous result of a discontinuance procedure
under the Act considerably less efficient than that which existed
before, since there would no longer be a single forum that could
finally determine the permissibility of a proposed discontinuance.
In the place of the state or federal regulatory bodies, the Con-
gress would have substituted any and all federal district courts
through whose jurisdictions an Amtrak train might run.
Congress clearly did not intend to replace the delays often
inherent in the administrative proceedings contemplated by § 13a
of the Interstate Commerce Act with the probably even greater
delays inherent in multiple federal court proceedings.
143
Moreover, additional deference has been given to state court
remedies by the requirement for judicial implication added by Cort v.
Ash.14 4 Further erosion of federal jurisdiction can be expected in
areas traditionally relegated to state law. In sum, these decisions
constitute a clear signal that the Court is ready to expand agency and
state court jurisdiction at the expense of the federal courts.
B. Statutory Interpretation: Revitalization of the Expressio Maxim
In each of these decisions the Supreme Court held that expressly
provided remedies precluded an implication of other remedies from
the statute. 14 5 While admitting that the maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius must yield to a clear indication of legislative in-
tent, 4" the Court in Amtrak cited the 1929 decision of Botany
Worsted Mills v. United States 4' for the proposition that "'[w]hen
a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular mode, it includes the
negative of any other mode.' """ In SIPC the Court referred to its
Amtrak decision and rested its conclusion that only the expressly pro-
vided remedies can be pursued, in part, on the proposition that an
"express statutory provision for one form of proceeding ordinarily
implies that no other means of enforcement was intended by the
Legislature."' 49
In citing a 1929 decision for support of the expressio maxim, the
Court avoided numerous decisions of more modem vintage that have
criticized the maxim and deemphasized its role in statutory interpreta-
143. 414 U.S. at 463-64.
144. See notes 138-39 and accompanying text supra.
145. In Cort v. Ash the only specific remedy, apart from criminal penalties, was
found in the 1974 amendment that established an administrative procedure for seek-
ing injunctive relief. The Court held this to be the exclusive remedy for all injunc-
tive actions. 422 U.S. at 76. The Court also held that the express criminal penalties
did not necessarily preclude a private suit. Id. at 79.
146. 414 U.S. at 458.
147. 278 U.S. 282 (1929).
148. 414 U.S. at 458, quoting Botany Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 289
(1929).
149. 421 U.S. at 419.
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tion.150 In one such decision, SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,'51
the Supreme Court stated that rules of statutory construction, such as
the expressio maxim,
come down to us from sources that were hostile toward the legis-
lative process itself and thought it generally wise to restrict the
operation of an act to its narrowest permissible compass. How-
ever well these rules may serve at times to aid in deciphering
legislative intent, they long have been subordinated to the doc-
trine that courts will construe the details of an act in conformity
with its dominating general purpose. .... 152
The Supreme Court did, of course, look to the general purpose of the
statutes at issue in arriving at its recent decisions not to imply private
causes of action. It would be incorrect to say, therefore, that these
decisions, like the decisions referred to in Joiner Leasing,'53 came
from a source hostile to the legislative process. Indeed, great reliance
on the legislative process is evident in the Supreme Court's decisions
in that the Court preferred expressly created legislative remedies to
implied judicial ones. Yet its statutory construction was restrictive.
The return to the expressio maxim was perhaps also motivated by
doubts about the efficacy of private litigation, cynicism regarding the
judicial process, and a reaction to the philosophic stance of the courts
of appeals, which led those courts to supplement legislation freely
with judicially created remedies.
C. Use of Legislative History
As demonstrated earlier, the High Court reached conclusions
opposite those of the courts of appeals from the same legislative
history without enunciating a significantly different test for implica-
tion of private causes of action. The explanation lies in part in the dif-
fering approaches to legislative history.
In Amtrak the legislature's lack of response to a propo-
sal to add explicit private remedies was found by the court of
appeals to be no indication that the legislature intended to bar these
150. E.g., SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1943);
FTC v. Standard Motor Prods., Inc., 371 F.2d 613, 617-18 (2d Cir. 1967); Hunt
Foods & Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 286 F.2d 803, 807 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365
U.S. 877 (1961); Durnin v. Allentown Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 218 F. Supp. 716,
719 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
151. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
152. Id. at 350, quoted at 475 F.2d at 332.
153. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
remedies.' 54 The Supreme Court, however, reached the opposite con-
clusion.' 55 Similarly, the court of appeals in Cort concluded that the
legislative history showed that protection of corporate funds was one
of two equally important purposes of the legislation,'5 6 but the High
Court examined the same legislative history and found that protection
of stockholders was, at best, a secondary concern.' 57 The confusion
about the impact of legislative history is understandable: the issue of
an implied cause of action arises only when a statute is mute on the
point and the issue is difficult only when the legislative history is
unclear. Even in Amtrak, a case in which the Legislature considered
and rejected a private cause of action, the legislative history is of
dubious aid. As the Supreme Court stated, "Logically, several equally
tenable inferences could be drawn from the failure of the Congress
to adopt an amendment . .. 1.,
It is submitted that legislative history usually will be of
no help to courts confronted with the issue of whether to imply a
private cause of action. The court's approach to that history is of far
greater significance. Moreover, the Supreme Court's decisions in Am-
trak, SIPC, and Cort will not provide a clear guide. Indeed, the
Amtrak decision did not guide the Courts of Appeals for the Third
and Sixth Circuits in SIPC and Cort: although Amtrak had been
decided prior to their decisions, both courts implied private causes of
action. 15 9
VI. Conclusion
The Supreme Court has clearly taken a new direction in im-
plying private causes of action. The Court is motivated by a
154. 475 F.2d at 334-36.
155. 414 U.S. at 459-60.
156. 496 F.2d at 422.
157. 422 U.S. at 79-80.
158. United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 411 (1962).
159. The court of appeals in SIPC made no reference whatsoever to the Supreme
Court's decision in Amtrak. See 496 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1974). In Cort, however,
the Third Circuit reviewed the Amtrak decision at length. The majority held that
Amtrak would apply only if there were some express civil action remedy that could
be said to redress plaintiffs injury. The court held there was none under the Federal
Election Campaign Act. 496 F.2d at 421.
Judge Aldisert in dissent relied exclusively on Amtrak and found that there
should be no private causes of action. He saw the Amtrak decision as a "definite
signal to the courts of appeal and district courts to decelerate use of. . . [the reason-
ing in] 1.1. Case Co. v. Borak .. . to find implied civil remedies not expressly au-
thorized by Congress." 496 F.2d at 426-27. Judge Aldisert continued,
I am persuaded that the Amtrak court could not fail to notice the plethora
of implied civil remedy cases which arose from an unrestricted application
of J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, supra, and an overgenerous use of Justice Black's
overgenerous quotation in Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 685, 66 S. Ct. 773,
777, 90 L. Ed. 939 (1946), that 'federal courts may use any available
remedy to make good the wrong done.' I am convinced that the Amtrak
court consciously and deliberately applied the brakes and meant exactly
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judicially conservative philosophy quite different from that of the
Supreme Court during the term of Chief Justice Earl Warren. Chief
Justice Burger's dissent in Bivens foreshadowed this change in philos-
ophy:
I dissent from today's holding which judicially creates a
damage remedy not provided for by the Constitution and not en-
acted by Congress. We would more surely preserve the important
values of the doctrine of separation of powers-and perhaps get
a better result-by recommending a solution to the Congress as
the branch of government in which the Constitution has vested
the legislative power. Legislation is the business of the Congress,
and it has the facilities and competence for that task-as we do
not.'6
0
This attitude obviously leads the Court to defer to congressional
intent as expressed in legislative history. Under the judicially active
Warren Court the absence of express legislative intent was interpreted
to permit the judiciary to fashion remedies to further social and
statutory policies. 161 Under the Burger Court, however, the absence
of express legislative intent militates against implication. 62 To sup-
port its conservative approach the Court has exhumed the expressio
maxim of statutory construction, which enables it to rule that express-
ly provided remedies are the exclusive remedies available to injured
persons. Moreover, in Cort v. Ash the Court added a new element to
the doctrine: now a party must show that his case is not one tradition-
ally within the purview of the state courts.' 63 These elements of the
Burger Court's decisions are consistent with the often expressed view
of the Chief Justice that the case load of the federal judiciary should
be reduced."6
Although it may be foolhardy to predict the result of future suits
seeking implication of private causes of action, the authors believe
that two points can be made. First, with the Supreme Court as it
exists today, if a statute provides for participation by an administra-
what it said when it declared that a 'private cause of action not otherwise
authorized by the statute' may not be implied in the absence of clear 'evi-
dence of legislative intent.'
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161. E.g., Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 200 (1967).
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164. For example, the Chief Justice advocates abolition of the mandatory juris-
diction of the Supreme Court, three-judge district courts, and diversity jurisdiction.
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ive agency and such participation in any way would effectuate the
congressional purpose of the statute, the Court will not imply a
private cause of action. Second, if an express remedy is provided to a
private party, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will expand this
remedy by implication to other private plaintiffs unless there is clear
evidence in the legislative history that Congress wished to grant
standing to these other plaintiffs.
The recent Supreme Court decisions have a fundamental import-
ance that extends far beyond the present Court's treatment of the
ancient practice of judicially creating remedies to vindicate legal
rights. The decisions clearly demonstrate a trend away from the will-
ing involvement of the Court in private disputes to promote social
and statutory policies. They also illustrate a conservative view of the
judiciary's position vis-a-vis other branches of government that now
appears to dominate the Court and that is certain to influence its
decisions for years to come.
